Drones Not Done, TOO
Hit Me, If You Can: The Coy Decoy.
In an earlier post, “Drones Not Done, I described the modern battlefield:
“For the individual soldier, the land is as uninhabitable as the chemical-gassed and aerially-bombarded front lines of World War I. … It is equally inhospitable to machine.” - Ibid
I described the absurdly fantastic - - return on “investment” from using drones to destroy (other people’s) expensive things.
“$2,000 worth of drones kills a tank worth $2,500,000. … This ratio of “value” is 1,250 to ONE! … At a cost of $250,000, the Magura [drone boat] can damage or sink a vessel worth hundreds of millions of dollars. $100,000,000 divided by $250,000 equals 400 to ONE!” - Ibid
DESTRUCTIVE VALUE OF DRONES IS MATCHED BY THEIR DECOY VALUE - - TO FILL THE SKY WITH FIREWORKS, FRUITS OF FAILED INTERCEPTORS
Above is a standard gold bar, called a “Good Delivery” bar. These weigh around 400 troy ounces (12.4 kilograms or 27.4 pounds) and have a minimum purity of 99.5% (995 parts per thousand fine gold). You might find a bunch of these in Fort Knox. I priced one at time of this post: $1,367,000 at current spot of $3,417.50 per troy ounce.
“DON’T BRING GOLD BARS TO A ROCK FIGHT”
I wrote, in a post last week, “David and Goliath, Hubris and Underestimating Iran”, that Iran possessed a large pile of “rocks”. I reasoned that Israel (and the US) would hesitate to attack Iran: I was wrong.
Israel elected to throw gold bars at Iranian rocks.
Israeli air defenses are multilayered, designed to counter a variety of aeriel threats, from short-range missiles to long-range ballistic missiles. Each “shot” is very costly.
Iron Dome
Intercepts short-range rockets, artillery shells, and precision-guided munitions
$40,000 to $50,000 cost per interceptor (CPI) 🪙David’s Sling
Intercepts medium- to long-range ballistic and cruise missles
$700,000 to $1,000,000 CPI 💰Arrow 2 and Arrow 3
Intercepts long-range ballistic missles, including those at high altitude
$2,000,000 to $4,000,000 CPI 💰💰💰Iron Beam (testing) , Red Sky (niche), Sky Sonic (in development)
And, from the United States,
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)
Intercepts short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
$8,000,000 to $12,000,000 CPI 💰💰💰💰💰💰💰💰💰Patriot (and Israeli MIM-104 Patriot)
Intercepts ballistic missiles, aircraft, and drones
$2,000,000 to $6,000,000 CPI 💰💰💰💰Fighter Jets: F-15E, F-16, F-35
Have been used to shoot down drones and missles
AIM-120, AIM-9X, APKWS II armaments
$1,200,000 💰, $500,000 💰, $40,000 🪙 CPI, respectively
(An AI-enhanced analysis concludes each downed drone cost $500,000 to $700,000; This does not include the value of flight time or aircraft used!)
BUT COST PER INTERCEPTOR “SHOT” IS MISLEADING - - WHAT MATTERS IS COST PER SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPT! HOW MANY SHOTS TO KILL?!
Israel, pragmatically, has made it unlawful to share videos of missile strikes and interceptions, as this information has targeting value to the Iranians. We’re left to gather what we can from news reports and government statistics. For each of the systems, the probability that it intercepts, is below.
It is likely that these are inflated: Everyone involved would want these numbers to be reporter higher than actual - - Western press, defense contractors, military personnel, politicians, and so on.
So, let’s do a couple systems with slightly more conservative estimates of their intercept probability (Pi).
Iron Dome, at $50K/shot might take 5 shots for every 4 drones, or ~$60K per drone
Patriot, at let’s say $5M/shot might need 2 shots per target, or $10Million 😳
THAAD, at, say, $10M/shot might need 5 for every 4 targets, $12Million / target 😱
THROWING GOLD BARS AT THROWN ROCKS IS DISASTROUS STRATEGY - - STONE THROWER ONLY NEED PERSIST TO WIN
“A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.”
- Joshua, supercomputer of WOPR (War Operation Plan Response), ‘Wargames’
You’ve heard the iconic phrase. In the 1983 film “Wargames”, high school student David Lightman (Matthew Broderick) unwittingly hacks into a military supercomputer, ‘Joshua’, while searching for a new video game to play. He thinks he’s playing a game called “Global Thermonuclear War” - - Joshua takes the simulated threat for real. Gripping drama follows, as Lightman and girlfriend (Ally Sheedy) fight to stop the onset of WW3. Joshua’s conclusion at the drama’s end is apropos.
Defending valuable, fixed assets against drone swarms is impossible, at present.
The “game” is horrific for the defender, one-sided in favor of the drone attacker.
The text is in the colors of the Iranian flag, as the entire game matrix is in their favor. Assuming Israel does shoot an interceptor at an Iranian drone, Iran “wins” in every possible outcome (Top “Yes/Yes” empty, as struck drone must be bottom “Yes/No”.)
WINNING STRATEGY FOR DRONE ATTACKER IS GETTING DEFENDER TO “PLAY” THE GAME
In drone “damage” strategy, one weighs the value of the asset destroyed versus the cost of the drone used to destroy it. In drone “decoy” strategy, one weighs the value of the defensive assets expended versus the drone used to evoke it. Math is equally compelling.
If the attacker drone manages to strike a target asset, this is mere icing on the cake. The goal is to get the defender to defend, to expend the interceptor asset(s)!
I’ll tell you how to play this new game! Probability of interception is on the left, and it is a function of the variables on the right.
Did I not already convince you that I don’t care, too much, about Pi?! Look at my game grid, above. I throw the rock (drone), and I want you to throw a gold brick … or five.
Decoy strategy aims to maximize the enemy’s P_d, P_t, P_l !!! I want you to detect me, I want you to be able to track me, I want you to launch! Throw the gold!
Egad, even Iran wants the U.S. and Israel to believe that their systems work!!!
I’d like to do a follow up post. In it, I will illustrate the interactions between various layers of offensive drone and missile types, with varying operating tempos and objectives.
As you can see, the goal of the coy decoy is to get the interceptor to come out to play.